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 Secret Sharing refers to a method through which a secret key  can be shared 
among a group of authorized participants, such that when they come together later, they 
can figure out the secret key  to decrypt the encrypted message. Any group which is not 
authorized cannot determine the secret key . Some of the important secret schemes are 
Shamir Threshold Scheme, Monotone Circuit Scheme, and Brickell Vector Space 
Scheme. Brikell’s vector space secret sharing construction requires the existence of a 
function  from a set of participant  in to vector space , where  is a prime number 
and  is a positive number. There is no known algorithm to construct such a function  in 
general.  We developed an efficient algorithm to construct  function for some special 
secret sharing scheme. We also give an algorithm to demonstrate how a secret sharing 
scheme can be used in visual cryptography. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 In this chapter, we will walk through all the general definitions which are used 
throughout the thesis. Moreover, basic concepts like cryptosystems are covered with 
illustrative examples. 
1.1 Finite set  and its properties 
 Let p be a positive integer. Then we define   0, 1, … ,   1 . Suppose ,  
are two integers. Then      if and only if     is evenly divisible by , that is 
    ! "  for some integer !.              
Example 1.1.1:  Assume a value   23 which exceeds modulo   17 and let   8 
then 23  8  17, since 23  8  17.'  
Properties of Finite set  [1, 13] 
o Addition is closed, i.e., for any ,  Є ,   )  Є  . 
o Addition is commutative, i.e., for any ,  Є ,  )    ) . 
o Addition is associative, i.e., for any , , * Є ,  )  ) *    )  ) * . 
o Additive Identity, i.e., for any  Є ,  ) 0  0 )   . 
o Additive Inverse, i.e., for any  Є  , there exists a unique b such that  )  
 )   0  .     
o Multiplication is closed, i.e., for any ,  Є ,  Є . 
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o Multiplication is commutative, i.e., for any ,  Є ,   . 
o Multiplication is associative, i.e., for any , , * Є  *   *. 
o Multiplicative Identity, i.e., for any  Є   " 1   1 "   . 
o Multiplicative Inverse, i.e., for any non-zero  Є   there exist +, such that  
 " +,  1  . In order to have multiplicative inverse  must be a prime 
number. 
Example 1.1.2: Illustration of additive inverse 
) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 
2 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 
3 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 
4 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 
5 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 
6 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 
7 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
8 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Table-1 Additive inverse table' 
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Example 1.1.3: Illustration of multiplicative inverse 
- 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
2 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 
3 0 3 6 9 2 5 8 1 4 7 
4 0 4 8 2 6 0 4 8 2 6 
5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 
6 0 6 2 8 4 0 6 2 8 4 
7 0 7 4 1 8 5 2 9 6 3 
8 0 8 6 4 2 0 8 6 4 2 
9 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
Table-2 Multiplicative inverse table' 
1.2  Cryptosystems 
 Cryptography is the practice and study of techniques for secure communication 
and hiding of data in the presence of third parties. The fundamental objective [2,13] of 
cryptography is to enable two people to communicate over an insecure channel and to 
hide data without the risk of a third person interrupting it. Consider two people, Alice and 
Bob, who want to communicate (Email, credit card payment, chat messenger, etc.) over 
different insecure media. John is a third person who wants to tap the communication 
between Alice and Bob for overhearing or fabricating data between them so he might 
misuse it just like in credit cards. This is possible because the data is vulnerable on 
channel as it is in readable manner. So to secure the communication, Alice and Bob have 
to hide the data from others in such a way that the data is not readable. This can be 
achieved by Alice sending a message X to Bob by encrypting the message. One of the 
very early encryption methods is shifting characters by  position in X.  For example, 
message X=WORD and shift value =2. Then W is shifted to Y, O is shifted to Q, R is 
shifted to T and D is shifted to F. Hence message X=WORD is changed to YQTF. This 
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general process is called an encryption. Encryption is defined as a technique for hiding of 
plain text or message(X) by using secret key . This encrypted message is no longer 
meaningful to John. But when Bob receives the encrypted message he would not be able 
to read it without knowing secret key . So for secure communication between Alice and 
Bob, they both should agree on a shift value . Alice can use to encrypt the message and 
Bob can use it to decrypt, which is reverse shifting with  on encrypted message i.e., Y is 
shifted to W, Q is shifted to O, T is shifted to R and F is shifted to D. This process is 
called a decryption. Decryption is defined as a technique for retaining back the original 
message from the encrypted one. 
Definition1.2 [2,13]: Cryptosystem is a 5-tuple , .,/ ,  , 0 , where  
   is a finite set of plain text to create a message, 
 . is a finite set of cipher text to create an encrypted message, 
/ is a key space of finite set of possible keys , which are used for encryption, 
 is defined as a set of encryption rules, and 
            0 is defined as a set of decryption rules.  
For each  1 /, there is an encryption rule 23 1 4 and a decryption rule 3 1 0, where  
23:  5 . and 3: . 5  are functions such that 3623X 8  X for every plaintext 
X 1 . 
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                         Key: Encryption                                             Key: Decryption 
                                                                   …… 
         Insecure channel 
Figure-1 Illustration of encryption and decryption using a secret key 
The above Figure-1 illustrates that the sender encrypts the plain text with a secret key and 
passes it on to an insecure channel. The receiver on the other end receives the encrypted 
text and decrypts it with the same secret key to recover the secret plain text sent by the 
sender. Meanwhile no other third party can recover the text unless they have the same 
secret key (). This is illustrated by using two brief examples. 
Example 1.2.1: Illustration of Shift Cipher [8] as of cryptosystem. Shift Cipher consists 
of 5-tuple :  
;, 
;, /,  , 0 <, where   .  /  
;  0, … , 25. Encryption and 
decryption rules are defined as follows: Let  be a secret key from key space / and X is 
message from plain text : 
                  23X    X )      .                  
                 3623X 8   23X       . 
A B C D E F G H I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
J K L M N O P Q R S 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
   
T U V W X Y Z 
Bob/ 
Receiver Message(X) 
Encryp
ted 
Text 
Encryp
ted 
Text 
Message 
(X) 
Alice/ 
Sender 
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19 20 21 22 23 24 25 
 
A>0, …, Z>25 is represented in the above table. Consider Alice as the sender, Bob as 
the receiver and John as a third person. Now Alice wants to send a message “MEET 
YOU AT ONE” to Bob but he doesn’t want anyone to overhear or fabricate the original 
message on the way to Bob. Alice and Bob share a secret key which is private only to 
them, say =2. Alice encrypts the message using Shift cipher technique by shifting the 
character in message X by 2. Before she encrypts the white spaces are removed from 
message X. 
Message X= MEETYOUATONE. 
Transform the characters in message X into integers, from the above table. Now the 
secret key Κ is added to the integer representing each character in message X. If the sum 
exceeds 26, say 29. Then the sum would be 3 after being reduced by modulo 26.  
  M: = (12+2) mod 26= 14, gives you O based on the above table.                        
  E: = (4+2) mod 26= 6, gives G. 
Similarly the rest of the cipher characters are computed.  
14 20 21 22 23 24 25 2 21 16 15 6 
 
The Cipher text is based on the sum values generated from the above table. The message 
which John receives if he taps the channel is OGGVAQWCVQPG; this is non- 
understandable to him. So the message is secured and safely delivered to Bob. Bob uses 
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the same secret key =2 to decrypt it by shifting it back by two characters to transform 
cipher text into “the original plain text” (without white spaces).' 
Example 1.2.2 Permutation Crypto system is 5-tuple @
;, 
;, /,  , 0A where plain text 
space and cipher text space are 
; and key set / is set of all permutation over 
{1,2,…,26}. This technique is different from shift cipher as shift cipher uses substitution, 
whereas permutation cipher replaces plain text with different cipher text characters. Let’s 
say Alice wants to send a message X to Bob which is X=MEET AT ONE. Now the secret 
key is the permutation which replaces the character of plain message X with cipher 
characters. The Encryption and decryption method for permutation cipher is as follows 
  2BC  C . 
  B62BC 8  +,62BC 8. 
Let’s pick secret permutation  as key, follows: 2B= (1 2 3 4 … 26), that is, 
     1   2   3   …   25   26      
   2   3   4   …   26   1            
               
Firstly white space are removed from X, that is, X=MEETATONE. Then apply the 
permutation on message X. The resultant cipher text will be NFFUBUPOF. To recover 
the message X, inverse permutation has to be applied. This is referred as +,. 
           1     2    3 …. 26      
           26   1    2 ….    1                                      
Bob can pull out the information with B= (1 26 25 … 3 2).' 
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  Cryptography is of two types, public key cryptography and secret (private, 
symmetric) key cryptography. Private-key cryptography is what we have seen so far.  
There are two participants: a sender and a receiver. They choose a private key  for their 
secure communication. In public-key cryptography secret key  has two components 
Dpublic | privateQ. Public part of the secret key is known to everybody but private part is 
only known to the receiver. Now when the sender wants to send some information to the 
receiver over an insecure channel, he encrypts the data with the receiver’s public key. 
Only the receiver can decrypt with his private key while no other can. 
1.3 Secret Sharing Cryptosystem 
 In private-key cryptography, giving a secret key  to an individual may not be 
secure. That individual may misuse the secret key . For example a car company, such as 
GMC or Ford, has developed its future sports car model. This new model needs to be 
saved in a secure environment so that competitive companies would not know anything 
about the new model. Here security of such a project may not depend on a single person. 
Because the individual may misuse the information that he/she has, hence the idea of a 
secret sharing scheme was introduced in cryptography. Secret sharing scheme is a 
method through which a secret key  is shared among the group of participants. That is, 
each participant receives a share or shares about the secret key . To determine the secret 
key , all participants belonging to the authorized group must pool their share together. If 
one or more participants from the authorized group go missing, then the remaining cannot 
determine the secret key . The main motivation for secret sharing scheme is to 
safeguard the secret information by protecting the key, as key can’t be trusted in the 
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hands of one. One solution is to distribute it, such that the access is no longer in the hands 
of one. 
Example 1.3.1 Consider two people who share a business and a joint checking account 
related to it. For withdrawal a check needs to be signed by both. If any one of the 
signatures goes missing on the check, they won’t be able to withdraw the amount from 
their account. So without the knowledge of both, withdrawal of an amount is impossible. 
In this case shares are the signatures of individuals. The secret key (check) is recognized 
only when both signatures come together.' 
 In cryptography different secret sharing schemes exist. Secret Sharing Scheme 
was first proposed by Adi Shamir and George R. Barkley in 1979 [9, 13].  Even the very 
first secret sharing scheme was named after Adi Shamri as “Shamir threshold scheme”. 
Later on, different schemes came into existence. Some of them are Monotone circuit 
construction [13], Brickell vector space construction [13] and many more. 
1.4 Some Basic Definitions 
In this subsection, we will cover several definitions which are used throughout the thesis. 
Participants: Participants are a group of people, who participate in key distribution. 
Commonly denoted as    R,, R
, … , RS  . 
Dealer: T is a special participant where T U  . He is responsible for share distribution 
to  . 
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Authorized set: A subset V of .When all the participants in V pool their share; they 
should be able to determine the secret .                         
Example 1.4.1 V   R,, R
, means R,, R
 together are authorized to pull out key K.' 
Access Structure: Set of authorized groups Γ is called as access structure. That is 
Γ  VW|VW is an authorized set. 
Secret sharing scheme: Secret sharing scheme is an algorithm through which shares of 
secret key   are distributed to corresponding participants in such a way, that only the set 
of authorized participants can recover the secret key  while no other can. 
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CHAPTER 2: SCHEMES 
 In this chapter, we will summarize three well-known secret sharing schemes. 
They are Shamir’s threshold scheme, monotone circuit construction, and Brickel’s vector 
space construction. Since all these three secret sharing schemes are perfect secret sharing 
schemes, we first define perfect secret sharing scheme. 
 
Definition 2.1: A perfect secret sharing scheme is a method or algorithm through which 
the secret key  is distributed among a set of n participants  in such a way that the 
following two properties are satisfied: 
o Every authorized set V 1  Γ can determine the secret key Κ, if their        
            shares  are pooled together. 
o Every unauthorized set  U  Γ cannot determine secret key Κ, even   
            if their  shares are pooled together. 
Example 2.1: Consider    R,, R
, R	, R be the set of participants. Let the access 
structure ^   R,, R
, R
, R	, R	, R. Based on ^ the authorized sets VW are V, R,, R
, V
  R
, R	, V	  R	, R. The shares of the secret key  are distributed to 
participants  based on the access structure ^ which satisfies the definition 2.1. If the 
authorized group V is the subset of a set say _, then _ will automatically become 
authorized as V. This has been illustrated in Figure 2 where the bold rectangular boxes 
are authorized and circular ones are unauthorized. 
12 
 
 
Figure- 2. Illustration of authorized sets. 
 Depending upon the above access structure ^, any group say  U ^ cannot determine the 
secret key . For Example,    R,, R	 is an unauthorized set and cannot determine the 
secret key Κ.' 
2.1 The Shamir Threshold Scheme 
Shamir Threshold Scheme is ideal for safeguarding the information, by allowing only 
authorized participants to reveal the information. In a real time situation according to 
Time Magazine [15], the Russian President, defense minister and defense ministry tags 
by carrying a briefcase of electronic control for nuclear ignition which is called “Foot 
Ball” by the Americans. So out of these three, any two can conjunct to ignite the nuclear 
weapon.     
Definition 2.1.1 [13]: Let ` be an integer with ` a  b. `, b  is a threshold scheme by 
which secret key  is shared among the set of b participants, such that ` or more 
participants can compute the secret key . But not less than ` participants can compute 
the secret key . 
R,, R
 R
, R	 R	, R 
R, R
 R	 R 
R,, R	 R,, R R
, R 
R,, R
, R	 R,, R
, R R,, R	, R R
, R	, R 
R,, R
, R	, R 
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Threshold access structure is ^   V  c  |V|  d  `.  
Example 2.1.1:  ^   V  c  |V|  d  3 where   R,, R
, … , RS  . Set of any 
participants less than 3 cannot recover the secret key . 
Algorithm 2.1 [7,13]: General (t, n) Shamir threshold  
Input:  Let R,, R
, … , RS be a set of participants and let ` be an integer 
              value such  that  ` a b. 
Output: Shares ef for each corresponding participants RW,                                                where 1 a g a b.                                   
Initial process:  
1. /* T chooses distinct h values, such that h i 0 b h 1  , 
where p is a prime number. */                                                                                                jk g l 1 ` b                                                                                                  RW l hW ;                                                                                               
//The shares hW are distributed to participants RW as public shares.                                                                                                 
Share Distribution: 
1. // T secretly chooses a secret key value , where Κ 1 Zo. 
2. jk g l 1 ` `  1                                                                            
  W l kb    , pq2k2 W  k2 gr`gb*`.                                                                                 
3. // T constructs polynomial h                                                                            
Consider s l 0;                                                                                                  jk t l 1 ` `  1                                                                                                          s l s ) uhu;                                                                                            
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h :  ) s   ;                                                                                  
4. // T computes the shares for each corresponding participant RW.                                          jk g l 1 ` b                                                                                                              eW     hW ;                                                                                                     RW l eW;  
//These shares eW distributed to corresponding participant RW, are private.
         
 
Example 2.1.2: Let a set of participants    R,, R
, … , Rv and let a threshold be (3, 5), 
that is,  `  3 and b = 5.             
Step 1: Let the access structure  ^    V | V w   , |V| d 3. 
Step 2: T selects elements  hW   g | 1 a  g a  5 as public share and distributes              
                 to set of participants  .  
Step 3: T selects secret key   x  7 and selects `  1 random elements W as  
 ,  5 b 
  1.    
Step 4: T Constructs polynomial  h    x  )  ,h ) 
h
     
                     h    h
 ) 5h ) 7.  
Step 5:  Computation of shares by T:        
  e,  1    13  17       
                              13                   
                          e
  2      21  17       
15 
 
                                    4                           
                           e	    3    31  17                                                                          
                        14        
             e   4    43  17       
                        9                                                                                           
             ev   5    57  17       
                        6 
Shares generated for each participant is as follows: Pi {xi (publicly known), eW (private)}                          
R, c  1, 13           
R
 c  2, 4           
R	 c  3, 14           
R c  4, 9           
Rv c  5, 6. ' 
Key Recovery: 
Key can be recovered by computing h  by authorized group VW. 
          h     ∑ eW u}u~,  ∏  ,3},3u ++  
Example 2.1.2: From the above example, let’s compute the  value from the available 
secret shares eW distributed to authorized group V  R
, R	, R. 
h    h  3 h  4 2  3 2  4  . 4 )  h  2 h  4 3  2 3  4  . 14 ) h  2 h  3 4  2 4  3  . 9 
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0    61  17   10  10 gb  17 gr 7   7 
           = 7.  Hence secret key  is recovered. ' 
Example 2.1.3: From the above example 2.1.1, let’s compute the  value from the 
available secret shares eW by unauthorized group   R
, R	. 
h    h  3 2  3  . 4 )  h  2 3  2  . 14  
0    16  17  1 
   i 1.  Hence secret key  is not recovered; similarly any t-1 participants forming a 
group cannot recover the secret key  . ' 
Disadvantage of Shamir threshold ,   scheme 
This scheme is said to be theoretically insecure, as ` or more participants from b can 
recover the secret key . Thus, there is no way to choose participants from  to form a 
group of dealer T choice. 
2.2 Monotone Circuit Construction Scheme 
Monotonic circuit construction is attributed to Benaloh [13] and Leichter [13]. This 
construction consists of a Boolean circuit with “OR” and “AND” gates represented in 
disjunctive normal form. 
Definition 2.2.1: A circuit C with b inputs and  outputs, constructed with AND, OR 
and NOT gates is called as boolean circuit C. 
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Definition 2.2.2 [9]: Let Ch,, h
, h	, … , hS  be a Boolean circuit. If C can be written as  
Ch,, h
, h	, … , hS  ~, } hWu  , then C is said to be in disjunctive normal form 
(DNF). 
Definition 2.2.3: A Boolean circuit in DNF form with b inputs and 1 output, constructed 
with only OR and AND gates is called monotone circuit. 
Example 2.2.1: Boolean circuit Ch,, h
, h	   h,  h
   h
  h	  in DNF form is a 
monotone circuit.' 
Before describing the algorithm to construct access structure from given monotone 
circuit, we will demonstrate this construction for the above circuit. 
Example 2.2.2: Let monotone circuit Ch,, h
, h	  h,  h
   h
  h	  , 
, 
for ,  h,  h
  b 
  h
  h	. First let us determine a set of participants  
R,, R
, R	, where each RW is corresponding input hW in C. Next we determine authorized 
sets V,  R,, R
 since h,, h
 are in , and V
  R
, R	  since h
, h	 are in 
. Now 
here is the access structure  Γ  V,, V
. 
The following algorithm gives the construction of Γ for any given monotone circuit C. 
Algorithm 2.2.1: Construction of access structure  Γ. 
Input: Monotone boolean circuit _h,, h
, h	, … , hS  ,
 …. 
Output: Access structure Γ. 
18 
 
Construction of  Γ: 
1. jk g:  1 ` b                                                                                                       
    RW  > hW                                                                                                         
 c R,, R
, … , RS 
2. jk g l 1 ` !                                                                                                              
      VW:  Ru   hu 1  W . 
3.  Γ:  V,, V
, … , V. 
 
The following is the secret sharing scheme (algorithm) realizing access structure Γ. 
Algorithm 2.2.2 [11]:  Monotone Circuit Construction (C) 
Input: Monotone boolean circuit C  
Output: shares e,, e
, … , eS to participants R,, R
, … , RS.  
Initial process: 
1. We construct access structure Γ by call algorithm 2.2.1.  
2. Assign all gates as W  jk 1 a g a !. 
Share Distribution: 
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1. // ! Inputs and 1 output wire of OR (  ) gate is assigned with . 
2. jk g l 1 ` !                                                                                                              
Let  `2 W pg`q ` gb`r                                                                                                    
  2.1  T choose `  1   variables from , say ,, 
, … , }+,.                                       
  2.2  T assign first `  1 inputs of W with ,, 
, … , }+, .                                
  2.3  T assign last input wire of W with    ,, 
, … , }+,   . 
 
Example 2.2.3: Let Ch,, h
, h	, h, hv, h;  ,  
  	 be monotone boolean 
circuit for ,  h,  h
  h	,  
  h,  h	  h b 	  hv  h;.  
Step 1: Where ,,  
 b 	, are sent to Algorithm 2.2.1 as an input. 
Step 2: Each hW is corresponded to each participant RW, thus forming a set of                   
              participants   R,, R
, … , R;. 
Step 3: Where V,  R,, R
, R	, V
  R,, R	, R b V	  Rv, R;, as V is a set of    
 participants belonging to . 
Step 4: Γ  V,, V
, V	, such that Γ  R,, R
, R	, R,, R	, R, Rv, R;. 
Step 5:  Γ and monotonic circuit C are sent as an input to Algorithm 2.2.2 to compute  
 and distribute the shares. 
Step  6:  Let’s suppose  ,, 
, 	 be AND gates and  be OR gate. 
Step 7:  All inputs and output to  be assigned with . 
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Step 8:  For gate ,with inputs `  3. T chooses `  1 elements from    as , b 
. 
               The last input wire is assigned with   ,  
  . 
Step 9:   Step 8 is repeated until all inputs to gates W are assigned with values, as follows. 
Step 10:  For 
: ,,  
,   ,  
  and 	: *,,   *,. 
Step 11: So therefore each participant receives the following as shares which are private 
                 in nature. 
  R,: ,, ,            
  R
:   ,  
            
  R	: 
, 
             
  R:   ,  
             
  Rv: *,               
  R;:    *, 
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  a1    a2      K-a1-a2   b1       b2      K-b1-b2            c1             K-c1 
   
 
 
                                                  K               K        K  
                 
     K      
  Figure- 3. Monotone shares distribution to set of participants 
Secret Key Recovery: 
1. For any VW authorized set, secret key  can be recovered by summing up their shares 
to  . 
Example 2.2.4: Illustration of secret key  recovery by authorized party 
Consider V  R,, R
, R	 from above example 2.2.3. When the shares of participants in B 
are pooled together, it gives out the key as shown below. Similarly any other authorized 
groups of  ^ can compute the secret key .          
       , ) 
 )   ,  
      .' 
 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 
, 
 	 
 
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Example 2.2.5: Illustration of secret key  recovery trail by unauthorized party 
Consider   R,, R
, R from above example 2.2.2. When the shares of participants in  
are pooled together, it does not give out the key as shown below. Similarly any other 
unauthorized groups  U ^ cannot compute the secret key .          
, ) 
 )   ,  
     i .' 
2.3 Brickell Vector Space Constructions 
The vector space construction [4] is introduced by Brickell. This generalization by 
Bertilsson [6], leads to secret sharing scheme in which the secret can be computed 
efficiently by each qualified group. 
Let’s suppose,  
    be a positive number, where  d  2. 
    is set of positive numbers, where  is prime number. 
  68 denote the vector space over  . 
                         Γ be defined as the access structure.  
Let’s assume a function  exists  :  5 68 such that it satisfies the following property         
, , , … ,   Є D      | Є  Q    Є   (2.3), 
The construction of function  is a matter of trial and error. Though we see some 
construction generated randomly by trial method satisfying property 2.3 in example 2.3.1. 
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In an upcoming chapter we will discuss a proposed algorithm to construct the function  , 
satisfying only some access structure. 
Algorithm 2.3[5,11]: Brickell vector space share distribution 
Input: Function  satisfying property 2.3, access structure Γ and set of participant 
  
Output: share e,, e
, … , eS to participants R,, R, … , RS. 
Initial process:  
1. jk g l 1 ` b                                                                                                   
    RW l  RW , pq2k2  RW  Є 68 .                                                                          
// T distributes  RW  ` RW   .These shares are public in nature. 
Share Distribution: 
1. T chooses secret  form  . 
2. T selects   1 secret elements 
, 	, … ,      from   .          
3. T construct the vector    , 
, 	, … ,   .                                                                                   
4. // T computes shares eW corresponding to RW.                                         
jk g l 1 ` b                                                                                                     
     eW c  ā.  RW ;        
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Example2.3.1: Let a set of participants   R,, … , R, ^   R,, R
, R	 , R,, R  be 
access structure. 
Step 1: By trial and error we can find the following  function satisfying 2.3.  
    R,    0,1,0  
    R
    1,0,1  
      R	    0,1, 1  
     R    1,1,0   
Step 2: Based on the  function   3.                                                                                            
Step 4: First we need to show that this function  satisfies the property 2.3.                       
              For that we need to find the coefficient *W for function  RW  .  
  1,0,0    ∑ *W  RW . 
             From access structure Γ, V,  R,, R and V
  R,, R
, R	.                                                                        
              For V, :                                                                                                                                                 
                      1,0,0   *,  R, ) *  R       
           *,0,1,0 ) * 1,1,0      
           *, *, ) *, 0 .                                                                                                                 
                                  *  1 b *,  1.    
              For V
 :                                                                                                                                                 
                      1,0,0   *,  R, ) *
  R
 ) *	  R	      
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         *,0,1,0 ) *
 1,0,1 ) *	 0,1, 1                                                                                 *
, *, ) *	, *
  *	 .                                                                                                                 
                                  *,  1, *
  1 b *	  1.                                                   
Now when we substitute the *W in ∑ *W  RW , it must generate 1,0,0 .   
So, we have  
           R, )  R
 )  R	  0,1,0 ) 1,0,1 ) 0,1,1  1,0,0 .                        
            R, )  R  0,1,0 ) 1,1,0  1,0,0 .     
Thus we can say that this function  satisfies the property 2.3.                                                                                  
Step 5:  T chooses secret key   8. 
Step 6:  T selects   1 secret elements 
  4 b 	  1. 
Step 7:  T constructs vector ā   8, 4, 1 .   
Step 8: T computes shares eW    ā.  RW . 
     e,    8, 4, 1 . 0, 1, 0                             
              4  17              
              4 
    e
    8, 4, 1 . 1, 0, 1              
            4  17                                      
            9 
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     e	  8, 4, 1 . 0, 1, 1                                   
             3  17             
              3 
     e    8, 4, 1 . 1, 1, 0                         
              12  17              
              12 
Step 5:  Each participant receives secret shares as follows. 
            R,: 4          
 R
: 9                                  
              R	: 3                                                R: 12.' 
 Secret key Recovery 
1. Assume ā. 1, 0, … 0   ¢, such that 
¢   ā . ∑ *W  RW  pq2k2 g: RW  Є V. 
That is ¢   ∑ *W  . eW  , pq2k2 g: RWЄ V. 
Example 2.3.2: Based on the above example, let’s take B,   Ρ,, Ρ
 , Ρ	  as an 
authorized set. 
Step 1: Pooling all shares of participants in V, together.     
 1, 0, 0 . , 
, 	    *,. e,  ) *
 . e
 ) *
 . e	      
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1, 0, 0 . , 4, 1     4 ) 9 ) 3       
        8  17        
        8.           
 Hence secret key  is recovered.' 
Example 2.3.3: Based on above example, let’s consider an unauthorized set   Ρ,, Ρ
. 
Step 1: The unauthorized set will not be able to find the coefficient *W, as polynomial   
 contradiction would occur. Let’s try to find *W, for defined unauthorized set  . 
Step 2:  1,0,0  *,0,1,0 ) *
 1,0,1                                             
                              *
, *,, *
  
                *,  0, *
  1 k 0  .  
 Thus a contradiction for *
 , as it has two solutions.  Similarly, any unauthorized           
group cannot recover the secret key . 
Step 3: Without the coefficient, the unauthorized group cannot compute secret 
              key.' 
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CHAPTER 3: CONSTRUCTING  FUNCTION FOR SPECIAL 
ACCESS STRUCTURE 
 In this chapter, we describe the construction of the  function in polynomial time 
for some special access structure. First we will give some definitions from graph theory. 
Definition 3.0[12]: A graph ¥, ¦  is called a bipartite graph if its vertex set V can be 
partitioned into two disjoint subsets A and B such that every edge in  joins a vertex in A 
to a vertex B. 
                                  A                                                 B 
Figure- 4.Bipartite Graph G ' 
Definition 3.1[12]: A bipartite graph ¥, ¦  in which every vertex of A is adjacent to 
every vertex in B is called a complete bipartite graph. Where A and B are partitioned 
subsets of the vertex V of . If |A|=m and |B|=n, then the complete bipartite graph is 
denoted by §,S and has b edges. 
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                                 A                                                 B 
Figure- 5.Complete Bipartite Graph : ,	'    
Definition 3.2: A graph ¥, ¦  is called multipartite graph if its vertex set ¥ can be 
partitioned into ! disjoints subsets say ¥,, ¥
, … , ¥, such that every edge in  joins vertex 
from ¥W and ¥u , where g i t. 
                               ¥,                                                               ¥
                                                                      
 
 
 
                                                                        ¥	 
Figure- 6. Multipartite Graph G' 
Definition 3.3[5]: Multipartite graph is called complete multipartite graph if all the 
vertices ¥W is connected to all the vertices in ¥u for all g i t. The complete multipartite 
graph is denoted by S¨,S©,Sª,…,S« if |¥W | bW, 1 a g a ¬. 
P1 
 
 
 
P4 
P6 
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                                ¥,                                                 ¥
                                                                      
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                       ¥	 
Figure- 7.Complete Multipartite Graph : 
,	,'    
3.1 Construction of  function for special access structure I 
Access structure is defined as follows: Let ¥, ¦  be a complete multipartite graph, then 
we can construct access structure Γ­ as follows: 
  ¥, Γ®  r2` j 2¯2r j   ¦ 
Example 3.1.1: Let G be a complete bi-partite graph given in Figure 7. Then the set of 
participants   ¥   R,, R
, R	, R, Rv, R; and access structure Γ®  is 
R,, R	, R,, R, R,, R;R
, R	, R
, R, R
, R;, Rv, R	, Rv, R, Rv, R; 
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                                 A                                                 B 
Figure- 8.Complete Multipartite Graph : 	,	' 
Theorem 1.0 [11]: Suppose   ¥, ¦  is a complete multipartite graph. Then there is an 
ideal scheme realizing the access structure Γ­ on participant set ¥. 
Proof: Let ¥  ¥,  ° ¥
 ° …° ¥± be a set of vertices of G. Let  h,, h
, … , h± be distinct 
elements of , where  d ¬. Let   2. Variable hW is representing set ¥W for i=1,2,…,l 
For every participant s 1 ¥W, define a function  s  hW, 1 . Now we can show that this 
function satisfies (2.3). Let suppose, V  RW, Ru 1 Γ such that RW 1 ¥W b Ru 1 ¥u. 
Thus  RW  hW, 1   and  6Ru8  6hu , 18 , where hW i hu. Hence 
     ,.  RW ) 
.  6Ru8  1,0  
   ,. hW, 1 ) 
. hu , 1  1,0  
   , ) 
  0 b ,. hW ) 
. hu  1 
    
  ,,   ,. hW  ,. hu  1   
   ,hW  hu  1  
P1 
 
P2 
 
P5 
        P3        
         
        P4 
                
            
P6 
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as hW  hu i 0, b gbs2kr2 2hgr` r*q `q` ,  hW  hu +,. Therefore shares of any 
authorized set can generate (1, 0).  Let suppose, _  RW¨ , RW© , … , RW« is an unauthorized 
set. By the definition of complete multipartite graph, there exist g such that _ w
¥W .Thus  6RW¨8   6RW©8   6RWª8  ²  6RW«8  hW , 1  . Hence 
    ∑ W  6RW«8  1,0  
     ,.  6RW¨8 ) ²) ±.  6RW«8  1,0  
   ,. hW, 1 ) ²) ± . hW, 1  1,0  
   , ) 
 ) ²) ±  0 b ,. hW ) …) ±. hW  1 
    hW, ) 
 ) ²) ±  1  
   
, ) 
 ) ²) ±  hW+,  
Thus, it is a contradiction.  
Algorithm 3.1.1: Construction of  from complete multipartite graph ¥, ¦ . 
Input: Complete multipartite graph for S¨,S©,Sª,…,S« 
Output:  :  5 
 
Process:  
1. Determine vertex ¥W jk g  1,2, . . ¬. 
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2. Find ¬ distinct elements h,, h
, … , h± of , pq2k2  < ¬ and hW is 
associated with ¥W. 
3. jk g  1 ` |¥| 
         Compute  Ru)=( hW , 1 , where Ru 1 ¥W 
4. Construct  as follows 
  ³h, 1h
 1… …h± 1´ 
5. Return  . 
 
Example 3.1.2: Illustration of the above Algorithm 3.1.1 
Step 1: Let’s derive complete multipartite graph G from Figure 7 as input. 
Step 2: Vertex ¥  ¥,, ¥
  R,, R
, Rv, R	, R, R;. 
Step 3 Let distinct elements be h,, h
 of  such that h, > ¥, b h
 > ¥
. 
Step 4: For every RW 1 ¥W we compute  µRW¶  hW, 1 . 
Step 5: That is for ¥,:  R,  h,, 1 ,  R
  h,, 1  b  Rv  h,, 1 . 
Step 6: Similarly for ¥
:  R	  h
, 1 ,  R  h
, 1  b  R;  h
, 1 . 
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Step 7: Matrix constructed as follows: 
                 
·¸¸
¸¸¹
h, 1h, 1h
 1h
 1h, 1h
 1º»
»»»
¼
 
' 
3.2 Construction of  function for special access structure II  
Access structure in this section is represented with a multipartite graph G.  But the graph 
G is not a complete multipartite graph.  Here is the definition of such access structure. 
Let     R,, R
, R	, … , RS be set of participants and Γ  V,, V
, … , V be an access 
structure with the following two properties: 
• VW½Vu  ¾ jk ¬¬ g i t.  
• Vu   jk t  1,2,3, . . !.  
Example 3.2.1: Let G (V, E) be a multipartite graph with vertex set ¥ 
 R,, R
, R	, R, Rv, R; depicted in Figure 8. 
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                               ¥,                                                               ¥
                                                                      
 
 
 
                                                                        ¥	 
Figure- 9. Multipartite graph representing Γ 
From the above multipartite graph, we construct access structure as follows: 
Γ  V,, V
  R,, R
, R	, R, Rv, R;, where a set of participants are a vertex set of 
graph    G. 
The following is the algorithm to construct a  function satisfying (2.3) for a given access 
structure Γ. ' 
Algorithm 3.2: Construction of matrix M representing function  
Input: Let    R,, R
, R	, … , RS be set of participants     and                                                   
            let Γ  V,, V
, … , V be access structure such that VW½Vu  ¾   for all  
           g i t  and |VW|   for g  1,2,3, … , !. 
Output: Matrix M representation of function  . 
Initial process:  
P1 
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1. Calculate columnc 2 -   1; // no of columns for matrix M. 
2. jk r l 1 ` !   
         Create  " 2  1 matrix ¿ with zero entries. 
3. Find ! distinct elements of  such that h < h+, < ² < h, < 1. 
Construction: 
1. jk r l 1 ` !                                                                                                                             
        // `2  " 2  1 `kgh ¿  
2.         jk g l 1 `                                                                                                                              
                ¿ W,W  1 
3.        jk g l 1 `   1                                                                                     
                  ¿ W,WÀ,  1            
4.        jk g l 1 `   1        
                ¿ W,§ÀW  h                                                                                         
                  ¿ WÀ,,§ÀW  h 
5. ¿  ³¿,¿
…¿´ 
6. Return ¿. 
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Example 3.2.4:  
Let   R,, R
, R	, … , R; be a set of participants and access structure Γ  V,, V
 
R,, R
, R	, R, Rv, R;. Γ satisfies both properties given above. |V,|  |V
|    3 
and !  2. Let us take    5 be a prime number. 
Step 1: Construct two  3 " 5  matrices ¿,,  ¿
 with 0 entries 
Step 2: Choose two distinct elements h,  2, h
  3 of v 
Step 3: For ¿,: ¿W,W  1  jk g l 1 ` 3. 
1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 
 
Step 4: ¿W,WÀ,  1 jk g l 1 ` 2. 
1 1 0 0 0 
0 1 1 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 
 
Step 5: Consider ¿W,	ÀW  2 and ¿WÀ,,	ÀW  2 jk g l 1 ` 2 
1 1 0 2 0 
0 1 1 2 2 
0 0 1 0 2 
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Step 6: Repeat the above steps with h
  3 for ¿
. 
1 1 0 3 0 
0 1 1 3 3 
0 0 1 0 3 
 
Step 7: ¿  Á¿,¿
Â 
Step 8: resultant ¿  
1 1 0 2 0 
0 1 1 2 2 
0 0 1 0 2 
1 1 0 3 0 
0 1 1 3 3 
0 0 1 0 3 
 
Let’s prove that the above matrix M 3.1 satisfies the property 2.3. First if we take the first 
authorized set V,, then 
1,0,0,0,0  1,1,0,2,0  0,1,1,2,2 ) 0,0,1,0,2 . 
Next take the other authorized set V
, then 
1,0,0,0,0  1,1,0,3,0  0,1,1,3,3 ) 0,0,1,0,3 . 
Now let C be an unauthorized set. Then we have the following possible cases for C: 
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Case 1:|C|  1, then it is obvious that none of the rows of M is 1,0,0,0,0 . 
Case 2:|C|  2, then here is the list of unauthorized such sets: 
 
R,, R
, R,, R	, R,, R, R,, Rv, R,, R;, R
, R	, R
, R, R
, Rv,
 
R
, R;,R	, R, R	, Rv, R	, R;. 
 Let’s check for R,, R
: 1,0,0,0,0  ,1,1,0,2,0 ) 
0,1,1,2,2 . 
 ,  1 , 
  1 b 0, thus it is a contradiction. 
 Hence R,, R
 cannot generate 1,0,0,0,0 . The other cases are left to the  reader      
 to test. 
Case 3:|C|  3, then here is the list of unauthorized such sets: 
 
R,, R
, R,R,, R
, Rv, R,, R
, R;, R,, R	, R, R,, R	, Rv, R,, R	, R;,
 
R,, R, Rv,R,, Rv, R;,R,, Rv, R;, R
, R, Rv,R
, Rv, R;,R	, R, Rv,
 R	, Rv, R; . 
 Let’s check for R,, R
, R: 1,0,0,0,0  ,1,1,0,2,0 ) 
0,1,1,2,2 )
             	1,1,0,3,0 .  
  0, , ) 	  1 b , ) 	  0 , thus it is a  contradiction. 
 Hence R,, R
, R cannot generate 1,0,0,0,0 . The other cases are left to the 
 reader to test. 
Case 4:|C|  4, then here is the list of unauthorized such sets: 
 R,, R
, R, Rv,R,, R
, Rv, R;,R
, R	, R, Rv,R,, R
, Rv, R;. 
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 Let’s check for R,, R
, R, Rv:  
 
1,0,0,0,0  ,1,1,0,2,0 ) 
0,1,1,2,2 ) 	1,1,0,3,0 ) 0,1,1,3,3       
        =,1,1,0,2,0 ) 0,2,2,5,5 ) 	1,1,0,3,0       
            If and only if 
                                , ) 	  1, , )  ) 	  0, 2  0 
         It is a contradiction. ' 
Theorem 2.0: Let     R,, R
, R	, … , RS be set of participants and Γ  V,, V
, … , V 
be an access structure with the following two properties: 
• VW½Vu  ¾ jk ¬¬ g i t.  
• Vu   jk t  1, 2, 3, . . !. 
Then matrix M constructed by Algorithm 3.1 satisfies the (2.3) property. 
Proof: First one can observe that the matrix  ¿W constructed in step 1-4 has the following 
properties: 
1) First column of ¿W has only one 1. 
2) Columns 2 to m have exactly two 1’s. 
3) Columns m+1 to 2m-1 have exactly two hW’s. 
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Let VW be an authorized set. Then share of participants of VW are rows of the matrix ¿W. 
Let WÃ, where `  1,2, … , be rows of ¿W. Then we have the following from the 
properties of  ¿W: 
1,0,0, … ,0  ∑ }§}~, WÃ=W¨+Wª ) ²  W© ) WÄ ) ²  
That is, 1, 0, 0, … . , 0  can be created as a linear combinations of shares of authorized 
set VW. Next let C be an unauthorized set. Then we need to show that the shares of C 
cannot generate 1,0,0, . . ,0  of their linear combination. Now we have the following 
cases: 
Case 1: |C|  r :  Then the C is either a subset of an authorized set or C contains 
participants from at least two different authorized set. First assume C is a subset of an 
authorized set. Then there exist g such that _ Å VW. Let the rows of matrices 
corresponding shares of C be W, where 1 a t a . Since |_| : , there is at least one 
row missing, say WÃ, where 1 a ` a . If the first row is missing, then there is no way to 
form 1,0,0, … ,0 . Otherwise  
 
1,0,0, … ,0  ∑ ÆÆ~, WÇ È ,  1       
                               È , ) 
  0      
                …. ….      
                    È }+
 ) }+,  0     
                       È }+,  0      
                    È }À,  0      
                       È }À, ) }À
  0     
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                  … ….      
                      È +, )   0           
But this yields a contradiction because }+,  0 and 1(or -1). If C contains participants 
from at least two different authorized set, then C may contain rows which are the same 
for the first m columns (see Case 4 in Example 3.2.4). We can add these rows to create a 
single row that has two non-zero elements in corresponding columns. Then the 
corresponding matrix will look like this: 
e, e, 0 … 0 h`, 0 … 0 
0 e
 e
 … 0 h`
 h`
 … 0 
… … … … … … … … … 
0 0 0 … e 0 0 … h` 
                         
Hence 1,0,0, … ,0  ∑ ÆÆ~, WÇ È ,e,  1      
                                 È ,e, ) 
e
  0            
                    …     …                                                   
                                                              È  +,e+, ) e  0        
                              …  …                                          
                                                              È  +,h`+, ) h`  0  
By ,e,  1, ,  e,+,  , hence all the W can be uniquely determined. But hW ` i
eW   for all g  1,2,3, … , r since  is large enough and by hW 1  such that h§ <
h§+, < ² < h, < 1. Therefore W cannot satisfy +,h`+, ) h`  0. 
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Case 2: |C|  r   Then C shares participants from at least two different authorized 
sets VW and Vu where g i t. Suppose 1,0,0, … ,0  is a linear combination of secret shares 
of participants in _.   
Then we have 1,0,0, … ,0  ∑ ÆÆ~, Ç È ,  1, , ) 
  0,… , +, )   0 
and there will be an index k for which Æ6hW  hu8  0, where W 1 . But this yields a 
contradiction because =0 or 1(or -1) but hW and hu belonging to VW b Vu are distinct 
and bigger than 1 as at least two participants from VW b Vu. Hence C cannot 
generate 1,0,0,… ,0 . 
Case 3: |C|  r < . Here the number of rows cannot be greater than . We refer case 1 
and 2 to provide proof. 
Hence C cannot generate 1,0,0, … ,0 . 
3.4 Brute Force Search 
In this section we tabulate some brute force test results. We wrote a brute force algorithm 
for small parameters to construct ɸ function. 
System Configuration which was used to run the brute force search algorithm: 
System Type It ran on a node (of a server) with 16 cores 
RAM   96 GB of RAM 
Operating System Red Hat 5.6  64-bit 
CPU Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU  E5640  @ 2.67GHz 
Table- 3 System configuration used for Brute force search 
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Programming language and other tools used to develop and run the brute force 
search: 
Programming language Java 1.6.0_21 
External Tools Mathematica 8.0.0.0 
Table- 4 Programming Language and tools used for Brute force search 
The following are the different cases for which the brute force was performed. 
Case 1: Input:  b l 4,: 2, *¬b: 2 -   2  2 b   3. 
 Number of matrices tested: 3Ê  6561. 
 Time Taken: 10 seconds. 
 Result: no such  function. 
Case 2: Input: b l 6,: 2, *¬b: 2 -   2  2 b   3. 
 Number of matrices tested: 3,
  531441. 
 Time Taken: 3600 seconds. 
 Result: no such  function. 
Case 3: Input: b l 6,: 2, *¬b: 2 -   1  3 b   3. 
 Number of matrices tested: 3,Ê  387420489. 
 Time Taken: 70200 seconds. 
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 Result: no such  function. 
Case 4: Input:  b l 6,: 3, *¬b: 2 -   2  4 b   3. 
 Number of matrices tested: 3
  282429536481. 
 Time Taken: 518400 seconds. 
 Result: no such  function. 
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CHAPTER 4: VISUAL CRYPTOGRAPHY 
 In this chapter, we discuss implementation of some secret sharing scheme on 
Visual Cryptography. Visual Cryptography was first introduced by Moni Naor and Adi 
Shamir in 1994 [9]. They demonstrated a visual secret sharing scheme, where an image 
was broken up into b shares so that only someone with all b shares could decrypt the 
image, while any b  1 shares revealed no information about the original image. 
Definition 4.0: Visual Cryptography is a method through which visual information like 
(image, video …) are encrypted and decrypted to receive original visual information. 
Let’s illustrate, through two examples. 
Example 4.0: A visual file (browser window) [16] which consists of pixels colored in 
black and white. The encryption is performed by hiding the image behind the pixels. To 
decrypt the image, one has to adjust the size of the file to a defined dimension; so that the 
image is visible by grouping of the pixels. This is one way how visual file is encrypted 
and decrypted. Here the secret key  is the dimension of the file. 
The dimensions of the visual file are: 
 Width: 1366 px.        
 Height: 667 px. 
The key dimensions through which the image can be visible are: 
 Width: 798 px.        
 Height: any px 
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Image encrypted behind the pixels Image is decrypted by providing 
the key 
Figure- 10. Visual Cryptography' 
The Visual Cryptography technique which we use in this thesis is different from what we 
have seen in previous examples. Following is an algorithm which we can use to encrypt 
and decrypt visual file (image). 
Algorithm 4.0: Algorithm to shuffle and reshuffle image, based on permutation 
Input: Ë¯2, 2k``gbÌbÍ, kpr and *¬br 
Output: Shuffled Image Î. 
Initial process:  
1. Calculate b c kpr - *¬br; 
2. Calculate *qb!q2g¯q` l  g¯2q2g¯q` Ï  kpr ; 
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                *qb!pg`q l  g¯2pg`q Ï  *¬br ; 
 hW   -  are the chunks of the Image pq2k2 0 : g : b. 
 
 
3. // Breaking image into b small chunks 
 jk g:  0 ` b                                                                                                                               
    hW c image with dimension chunkwidth, chunkheight. 
4. jk g:  0 ` b         // assign the image chunks to array chunkimage[ ]                                                                            
*qb!g¯2ÌgÍ  hW; 
Shuffling of Image: 
1. jk g:  0 ` b                                                                                                        
            `2ÌgÍ l *qb!g¯2Ð2k``gbÌgÍÑ;          
2. Î l kp `2  // on Image     
Re-Shuffling of Image: 
1. Find inverse permutation for permutation. 
2. jk g:  0 ` b                                                                                                        
            `2ÌgÍ l *qb!g¯2Ðgbs2kr22k``gbÌgÍÑ;      
3. Î: kp`2 ;                                                             
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Example 4.0.1: Consider an image X, rows=2, column=2 and permutation [] = {3, 1, 4, 
2} 
h, h
 
h	 h 
                                          Figure- 11. Original Image X 
Step 1: // Assume Image width=500, height=500 
Step 2: // Calculate b  kpr - *¬b that is b  4.  
Step 3: // Calculate *qb!pg`q  W§ÒÓÔÕW}ÖÆÕ  vxx
  250 and *qb!q2g¯q` 
              W§ÒÓÔÖÔWÓÖ}×±Ø§S  vxx
  250. 
Step 4: Total no of chunks possible is hW: 1 a g a 4. 
Step 5: Now break the image into 4 pieces (chunks) and assign to corresponding hW. 
Step 5: *qb!g¯2ÌgÍ:  hW // array chunkimage is initialized with hW. 
Step 6: Based on permutation the image is shuffled by shifting the positions of the chunks 
 in the array. So from given permutation {3, 1, 4, 2}: 
1 2 3 4 
3 1 4 2 
50 
 
 1 5 3, 2 5 1, 3 5 4, 4 5 2. The image Î holds the chunks with its new positions. 
                  
h
 h 
h, h	 
                                        Figure- 12. Encrypted Image Î. 
Step 7: To decrypt: First one needs to find the inverse for given permutation. Based on 
given permutation gbs2kr22k``gbÌ Í  2, 4, 1, 3. 
1 2 3 4 
3 1 4 2 
 
Step 8: The gbs2kr22k``gbÌ Í is applied on encrypted image Î, such that         
                  1 5 2, 2 5 4, 3 5 1, 4 5 3, thus giving back the original image. 
h, h
 
h	 h 
                                       Figure- 13. Decrypted Image Î ' 
In visual cryptography application the secret sharing scheme is not the main concern as 
any of the schemes can be used for key share distribution. This visual application uses 
key as a permutation, which is not integer but somehow we need to relate integer to 
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permutation. One possible way which I can think of is converting an integer to its 
corresponding permutation and vice versa. 
Example 4.0.2: Encryption and decryption of image based on the above example 
permutation. 
Permutation = {3, 1, 4, 2} 
        
 Figure- 14. Image encrypted 
Inverse permutation= {2, 4, 1, 3} 
        
 Figure- 15.Image decrypted ' 
4.1 Generating a permutation from secret key Ù 
In all previous secret sharing schemes, secret key K is an integer but this visual crypto 
system uses permutation as a secret key value. We need to able to find one-to-one 
relation between given integer and permutation, so that we can use any one of these 
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secret sharing scheme in our visual crypto system. Before we give an algorithm to 
construct a permutation for any given key K, we illustrate this construction with an 
example. 
Example 4.1.1: Illustration of permutation generation from secret key . 
Step 1: Select  l 137 a prime number, so ,	Ú  0,… ,136. 
Step 2: Now find a smallest b value such that  a b!. Hence b l 6. 
Step 3: Now  is selected, such that  1 . 
Step 4: Let suppose,  l 53. 
Step 5: Generate all possible permutation of 1,2,3,4,5,6 in lexical order. 
Step 6: From the list of permutations, the corresponding permutation for ! l 53           
              will be 53rd permutation of 6! 
Step 7: Else one can use an algorithm which relates an integer to permutation     
 ; which is discussed in Algorithm 4.1.1.' 
Algorithm 4.1.1[17]: To generate permutation from integer 
Input:  where  1  and b pq2k2  a b!. 
Initial process: Consider a string variable  l Ì1234…bÍ.                                                                 
                             The !}Ö permutation starts from0,1, … , b  1. 
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Working:  
Step 1: Find the ,, 
, … , }ÖS character of string  from                                                                                          
             !  1   ,b  1 ! ) 
b  2 ! ) ²) S. 0!  such that                                   
             0 a W a b  g. 
Step 2: Then take the ,}Ö character in the string, followed by the 
}Ö  
             character of what’s left, etc. 
Step 3: Thus bringing all the characters together will represent the permutation. 
 
Example 4.1.2: 
Input: Ü2`   21 1 ,,Ý, so b  5 as119 : 5!. To find 21st permutation, one needs 
 to find 20th permutation, according to above algorithm. Let String   12345. 
Step1: 20   ,4 ! ) 
3 ! ) 	2 ! ) 1 ! ) v. 0! . Now find ,, . . v   
 values satisfying condition 0 a W a b  g.  
Step 2: The values are ,  0, 
  3, 	  1,   0, v  0 
Step 3: Hence, 
 ,  0}Ö element of 12345 is 1 and remaining string is 2345     
 
  3Æ element of 2345 is 5 and remaining string is 234    
 	  1} element of 234 is 3 and remaining string is 24    
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   0}Ö element of 24 is 2 and remaining string is 4    
 v  0}Ö element of 4 is 4. 
Step 4: So 20th permutation is 15324. 
Step 5: Hence   21 5 2k``gb 15324'       
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 Brickell vector space secret sharing construction algorithm requires existence of 
function  with certain conditions. There is no known algorithm to construct such function  
for any given access structure.  Construction algorithm exists only if access structure is 
represented as an edge set of complete multipartite graph. For the rest, only trial and error 
is an option. We have developed a polynomial algorithm to construct such  function for 
another special access structure which is a multipartite graph but not complete. Moreover 
we used a brute force test, to find any better construction with less columns on some of 
the small parameters. For example b  4,  2,   3 and b  6 with   2,3 ,   3. 
But there is no function  in which matrix representation has a less number of columns 
than 2m-1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
REFERENCES 
[1]  H.Anton “Elementary Linear Algebra”, Eighth Edition. John Wiley and Sons, 2000. 
[2] H.Beker and F.Piper. “Cipher Systems, The Protection of Communications”. John 
         Wiley and Sons, 1982. 
[3] G.R. Blakley. Safeguarding cryptographic keys. Federal Information  Processing 
       Standard Conference Proceedings, 48 (1979), 313-317. 
[4] E. F. Brickell. Some ideal secret sharing schemes. Journal of  Combinatorial 
      Mathematics and Combinatorial Computing, 9 (1989), 105-113. 
[5] E. F. Brickell and D. M. Davenport. On the classification of   ideal secret sharing  
      schemes. Journal of Cryptology, 4 (1991), 123-134. 
[6] Marten van Dijk. Designs, codes and Cryptography. 1997, Volume 12, Number 2,                                                              
        pg.161-201.http://www.mendeley.com/research/linear-construction-secret-sharing-
       schemes/. 
[7] M. ITO, A. Saito and T.Nishizeki. Secret sharing scheme realizing general access 
         structure. Proceedings IEEE Globecom ’87, pages 99-102, 1987. 
[8] A.G. Konheim. “Cryptography”, A Primer. John Wiley and Sons, 1989. 
[9] Moni Naor and Adi Shamir. Visual Cryptography. EuroCrypt'94.  
       http://www.wisdom.weizmann.ac.il/~naor/PUZZLES/visual_sol.html. 
[10] A Shamir. How to share a secret. Communications of the ACM, 22(1979), 612-613. 
57 
 
[11] G. J. Simmons. An introduction to shared secret and/ or shared control schemes and 
      their application. In Contemporary Cryptology, The Science of  Information Integrity, 
      pages 441-497. IEEE Press, 1992. 
[12] G. Shanker Rao. Discrete Mathematics Structures. NEW AGE INTERNATIONAL 
      (P) LIMITED PUBLISHER, 2000. 
[13] D.R Stinson “Cryptography: theory and practice” CRC, 1995. 
[14] D.R Stinson “Cryptography: theory and practice” CRC, 2000. 
[15] Time Magazine, May 4, 1992, p.13.  
[16] http://mcdlr.com/visual-crypto/.   
[17] http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
